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I. INTRODUCTION 
Strategic management is the setting and implementation of an organization's direction, and 
the monitoring, evaluation, and adjustments in that direction as the organization engages its 
environment and interacts with its stakeholders. Having evolved from private sector prac-
tice, the principles of strategic management are now being applied to the public sector in 
the hope that managers and employees will use them to reinvent, redesign, and reengineer 
government operations. President Clinton's National Performance Review (1993) and the 
Congress's Government Performance Results Act (1993) are two recent attempts to intro-
duce the logic and discipline of strategic management to the federal government. Although 
it is still too soon to judge the ultimate effect of these efforts, we will speculate on their fu-
ture as we examine current governmentwide initiatives. 
We begin our review of strategic management in the federal government with an 
examination of its private sector roots. Since the exemplars of federal strategic man-
agement are drawn from business and industry, we need to understand strategic man-
agement's conceptual and intellectual foundation in order to judge its current applica-
tions in the public sector. To that end we identify models of business strategic 
management that represent the two poles on a continuum of approaches that have been 
and can be employed. The first is the directive approach, which takes a top-down view 
of strategic management. The second is the adaptive approach, which invites more or-
ganizationwide participation in the process of direction setting, implementation, and 
evaluation. These two approaches provide a comparative frame to examine what is cur-
rently under way at the federal level, and they help us identify the necessary and suffi-
cient elements to make strategic management successful. Most significantly, they en-
able us to ask a important question: Do the necessary and sufficient elements of strategic 
management exist to enable the successful transfer of strategic management principles 
into public practice? 
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Our answer to this question is not encouraging for those who champion the recent ini-
tiatives. Although the National Performance Review and the Government Performance Re-
sults Act offer much promise for management practice, they have not solved some of the 
fundamental dilemmas of strategic management in the federal government (Roberts 1993; 
Nutt and Backoff 1992). Key issues remain: the paradox of management control in a shared 
power system of governance established to check its control and powers; the transfer of pri-
vate sector, organization-based theories of strategic management to poorly coordinated and 
fragmented network structures in the government system; simultaneous maintenance of ac-
countability through a strict chain of command from elected representatives to organiza-
tional executives and managers, and adaptation to change, which necessitates individual 
and agency flexibility, experimentation, and innovation; responsiveness to the unique 
needs of customers; and the protection of equity and fairness for all citizens. 
Our analysis is that neither the Government Performance Results Act nor the Na-
tional Performance Review satisfactorily addresses these paradoxes. Assuming our consti-
tutional framework remains the same, and the federal government, no matter how much 
outsourcing, privatizing, and downsizing it experiences, retains some governance func-
tions, we see only one alternative remaining-the development of new approaches to fit the 
unique context of the public sector. Rather than mold a governance structure to fit business-
derived models, we believe it is more appropriate to develop strategic management ap-
proaches that are congruent with how we govern. We conclude by summarizing the basic 
features of these approaches and invite practitioners and theoreticians to explore their 
implications for public management. 
II. THE ROOTS OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN BUSINESS 
The term "strategic management," introduced by Ansoff, Declerck, and Hayes (1976), 
came of age with the seminal book of Schendel and Hofer (1979). Strategic management 
defines an organization's attempt to set a direction and to implement and evaluate it in light 
of its external environment and its internal capacity. According to Gluck, Kaufman, and 
Walleck (1982), strategic management has evolved through four sequential phases: 
Phase 1: Basic financial planning when managers seek better operational control 
through meeting of annual budgets and comparison of performance to bud-
getary targets 
Phase 2: Forecast-based planning when managers seek more effective planning for 
growth by trying to predict the future beyond next year 
Phase 3: Externally oriented planning (strategic planning) when managers seek 
increased responsiveness to markets and competition by trying to think strate-
gically 
Phase 4: Strategic management when managers seek to develop a competitive 
advantage and create a successful future by managing all the organization's 
resources 
Phase 4 thus focuses on the issues of implementation. During this phase, managers 
adjust the organization's structure, work processes, human resources, and subsystems such 
as information management, in order to make them compatible with the established direc-
tion. When the process is linked with phase 3' s emphasis on strategic planning and phase 
1 's reliance on results and evaluation, a full-blown model of strategic management 
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emerges. General Electric, one of the pioneers of strategic planning in phase 3, led the tran-
sition to phase 4 during the 1980s. By the 1990s, most large corporations around the world 
had followed, in the conversion from strategic planning to strategic management (Wheelen 
and Hunger 1995). 
Within this broad definition of strategic management, practitioners have devised 
numerous approaches, depending on the nature of their business, their size, their complex-
ity, and the level of change experienced in the external environment (Toft 1989). For 
simplicity, we group these approaches into two general categories that represent the end 
points of a continuum (Roberts 2000). Evidence to support the existence of this continuum 
comes from an analysis of organizational configurations (Doty et al. 1993). At one end of 
the continuum in Table 1 we find the directive approach to strategic management, charac-
terized as rational-analytic, sequential, and comprehensive (Andrews 1971; Steiner 1979; 
Miles et al. 1978; Lorange 1980). At the other end of the continuum is the adaptive 
approach to strategic management, described as insightful, innovative, and emergent 
(Campbell and Alexander 1997; Mintzberg 1994; Miles et al. 1978). 
A. The Directive Approach to Strategic Management 
The directive approach is a very structured, rational-analytic, and comprehensive approach 
to strategic management. First, top-level executives assess the environment and specify the 
goals the organization will pursue in light of the threats and the opportunities it faces. With 
the assistance of staff, they then identify optional strategies to address these goals. The 
costs and benefits of each strategy are assessed and a strategy is chosen to optimize on the 
goals being pursued. Implementation follows and its progress is monitored through specif-
ically designed management controls. The success of the implementation process depends 
on a good "fit" or congruence between the strategy set by top-level managers and the 
organization's internal capacity to execute the strategy. In other words, the organization's 
design elements (its human resource policies, structure and technology, etc.) have to be 
aligned properly with its new strategy. Strategy evaluation ultimately determines the extent 
to which the strategy has been successful, and therefore is continued, or unsuccessful, and 
therefore is modified or terminated. Upon making that determination, top-level manage-
ment then repeats the cycle of strategy formulation, implementation, evaluation; and 
making adjustments in light of changes in the environment or its internal capabilities. 









Goals set by top management 




Separated from formulation 
and evaluation 
Adaptive approach 
Insightful, intuitive, rational-analytil'. • 
Spontaneous-entrepreneurial 
Top management offers vision 
Emerges from anywhere 
Supportive of entrepreneurship; 
intertwined with formulation and 
evaluation 
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This rational-analytic process ensures a comprehensive, or synoptic, linkage be-
tween the direction set at the top and its execution throughout the organization. Corporate-
level strategies typically state the company's overall view toward growth, its position on 
various businesses and product lines in order to balance a portfolio of products and ser-
vices, its decisions on the type and number of businesses it will be in, its determination on 
how its financial and other resources will be distributed among its divisions, and its inten-
tions in dealing with key groups in its environment. 
In multidivisional firms, strategy formulation at the corporate level is followed by 
strategy formulation at the business-unit and functional levels. Business-unit strategies or 
competitive strategies focus on how to compete in a particular product or market or indus-
try segment. And the business strategy is expected to be in keeping with the strategy set by 
those above at corporate headquarters. Within the parameters established by corporate and 
business units, the functional departments develop their own strategies in R & D, market-
ing, production, etc., to realize the strategies of higher authority. Thus, reliant on a hierar-
chy of strategies set from the more general instructions at the corporate apex to the more 
specific at the divisional and functional levels, the organization integrates its activities in a 
comprehensive way to prevent deviation from its established direction. Ideally, all organi-
zational members are moving toward the same ends by coordinating their mutually sup-
portive strategic efforts. 
B. Adaptive Approach to Strategic Management 
The adaptive approach is a much more open-ended and flexible approach to strategic 
management. It begins with the assumption that insight and intuition, in addition to ratio-
nal analysis, are very important aspects of the process. Making decisions based on as-
sumptions about the industry, the market, and the competition is an inexact science at best, 
especially when there is a great deal of change and uncertainty in the environment. Top-
level executives ultimately have to fall back on their insights and intuitive powers to shape 
the organization's direction. Under these conditions, decision making becomes more akin 
to an act of faith than a strictly formalized rational-analytic process. It therefore makes 
more sense to set a direction that is fairly open and broad. Rather than formulating a spe-
cific goal that closes off opportunities and commits the organization to a particular course 
of action that may be problematic when unforeseen conditions arise, executives instead 
craft a general vision of the future, which enables them to keep their options open and take 
advantage of opportunities as they arise, a particularly important feature in a highly volatile 
environment. 
Operational-level members, given their up-to-date knowledge of customers, markets, 
and competition, are also involved in the direction setting process. Using upper manage-
ment's vision as guide for their day-to-day activities, they search for creative and innova-
tive ways to support the vision. Their "grass-roots" suggestions for new products and ser-
vices, when developed and approved by upper management, become new strategies for the 
future. Even their ideas that fail to generate support can be "banked" in the hopes that 
changes in the environment will make them more attractive in the future. Thus, strategies 
in the adaptive approach are emergent and sometimes unintended. They can and do surface 
spontaneously anywhere in the organization, not just from the strategies apex. Most 
importantly, they rely on the creative talents of all members of the organization, who, 
through their entrepreneurship and innovation, provide the details on how the organization 
will fulfill its vision. 
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Given the insightful, innovative, and emergent character of strategies in the adaptive 
approach, the phases of strategic management are not as neatly defined and separated. Vi-
sion provides direction instead of specific goals, and strategies emerge through interactions 
among organizational members and key players in the environment. Direction setting and 
evaluation often occur simultaneously as entrepreneurs surface new ideas and test them, 
first to gain the necessary resources and support from internal champions, then to gain ex-
ternal support from customers and other key stakeholders. Implementation relies on estab-
lishing an organizational infrastructure to support entrepreneurship and innovation. Re-
wards are important to induce risk taking and experimentation. Training and development 
are emphasized to give people the knowledge, skills, and competencies to be innovators. 
Measures and controls are geared to support risk taking, not to discourage it. Coordination 
formally relies on liaisons, committees, and task forces, and informally on the norms of co-
operation and mutual adjustment. Channels of communication are kept open to ensure a 
free flow of information throughout the organization. Authority for making decisions is 
rooted in situational expertise, not in the formal structure. 
C. Necessary and Sufficient Elements of Strategic Management 
Whether the approach to strategic management is directive, adaptive, or some variant in be-
tween, there are certain necessary and sufficient elements that must be in place for its prac-
tice. These elements do not guarantee successful organizational performance, but without 
them, the ability to manage strategically is severely constrained. The necessary elements 
are summarized in Table 2. The first is organizational identity. Identity distinguishes the 
sector(s) in which the organization is a part (e.g., profit or nonprofit). Formally expressed 
in its mandate and values, it also describes the function of the organization, maps its legal 
boundaries, and answers questions such as why the organization exists and what role it has 
in society. The importance of identity is evident in the example of AT&T. As a conse~ 
quence of its 1982 antitrust agreement with the Justice Department, AT&T changed from 
a regulated provider of local and long-distance telephone service and equipment to an un-
regulated, high-technology provider of long-distance voice and data communication ser-
vices and equipment. · · 
Table 2 Necessary and Sufficient Elements for Strategic Management Practice 
Necessary elements 
Mandate establishes organizational identity, boundaries, and values 
Technology sets up work processes (e.g., routine-nonroutine, small batch-large batch/continuous) 
Tasks specify work activities for personnel within work processes 
Structure integrates tasks (by function, by geography, by product, by market, by project) 
Subsystems link the components 
Financial and capital management allocates resources and maintains assets 
Human resource management attends to the needs of personnel 
Information management collects, analyzes, and communicates data 
Performance measures provide the capability to assess results 
Sufficient elements 
Dominant coalition leads the agency 
Consensus emerges on agency's direction 
Adjustments based on prior performance made to agency (direction, design factors) 
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Within the organizational boundary, strategic management is premised on the exis-
tence of a technology that establishes how work will be accomplished, or the flow of work. 
Technology has been characterized as either routine or nonroutine (Perrow 1967) or rang-
ing from small-batch technologies that produce one or a few units, to large-batch tech-
nologies that mass produce a large number of identical units, to continuous process tech-
nologies (Woodward 1965). Technology also been examined in terms of the specific work 
processes that are linked to generate a product or service. Recent interest in how an orga-
nization's technology is designed has led reformers to develop the principles of "reengi-
neering" (Hammer and Champy 1993). On the basis of its principles, businesses are to 
identify the fundamental processes of the organization from a cross-functional perspective, 
organize around the outcomes of those processes, eliminate steps that do not add value, and 
use computer information technology to expedite the work flow. 
Within the technology or work flow of the organization, individuals are assigned 
tasks or jobs. Some tasks offer very little guidance to personnel and others provide very de-
tailed instructions and performance expectations. Jobs can be designed and shaped to match 
the requirements of the technology and the capabilities of personnel who fill them (Hack-
man and Oldham 1980). The way tasks are grouped (by function, by geographic area, by 
market, by product, by project) determines the organization's structure. Structures range 
from very centralized to very decentralized (Wheelen and Hunger 1995:226-245). And dif-
ferent structural arrangements require very different types of coordination once people 
have been grouped together on the basis of the tasks they do (Galbraith 1973; Mintzberg 
1996b). 
Measurement of results ensures accountability and provides direct feedback on how 
well the organization is doing. The process begins with an agreement on which indicators 
should be used to chart performance. Common measures enable the organization to com-
pare its current performance with past performance, noting areas of improvement and 
weakness. Standardized measures across all organizations also give each organization and 
its stakeholders the capability of matching performance records (Wheelen and Hunger 
1995:280--307). Comparative data inject an element of competition as organizations seek 
to outperform one another. 
Various subsystems knit the organization's design components together. They in-
clude financial and capital management, human resource management, and information 
management. Financial management is the management of money and the determination 
of the appropriate level of resources, the allocation of resources according to priorities, and 
the spending of money accountably through processes such as procurement, accounting, 
cash management, and reporting. It includes both budget allocation and budget execution 
as well as capital management, the planning, maintenance, and disposal of long-lived re-
sources and the regular maintenance of assets. Human resource management involves the 
recruitment, training, development, promotion, rewarding, and termination of employees. 
Information management is the development, maintenance, and use of a system to collect, 
analyze, and communicate data. It responds to both the information demands of particular 
programs and the information requirements of other subsystems. 
These necessary elements provide the infrastructure of strategic management. 
Whether employing the directive or adaptive approach, strategic management requires 
these components as a starting point. The sufficient elements of strategic management, on 
the other hand, speak to the art of direction setting. Somebody needs to decide what the 
organization should do and ensure that others in the organization follow the established 
course of action. Thus, the organization first requires a dominant coalition made up of key 
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organizational actors who are powerful enough to enforce their views on others in the event 
there is disagreement (Thompson 1967; Pfeffer 1981 ). Whether tightly linked among those 
at the strategic apex, as in the case of the directive approach, or loosely configured with 
members throughout the organization, as in the case of the adaptive approach, the dominant 
coalition works to reach a consensus on direction. The direction can be well specified in 
terms of goals-the directive approach-or broadly framed in terms of a visiOn-the adap-
tive approach. Whichever approach is utilized, however, developing a consensus is essen-
tial. Without it, organizational activities become random and disconnected, producing what . 
some have referred to as a "garbage can" decisional process (Cohen et al. 1972). When this 
occurs, the organization remains locked into old routines, faithfully executing previous · 
activities, that, in the worst case, are no longer in keeping with changing realities (Cohen 
et al. 1972). 
When a direction has been established, if results are disappointing, the dominant 
coalition is charged with making adjustments, either in the direction pursued or in its im-
plementation. Congruence is a central aspect of making these adjustments (Nadler and 
Tushman 1988). Congruence is defined as "fit" or alignment among all the components of 
the organization and between the organization and its environment. For example, all the 
organizational design elements (e.g., technology, tasks, structure, subsystems) are expected 
to be compatible with one another. It does no good to centralize decision making and con-
trols and yet have a reward subsystem that reinforces initiative and decision making at 
lower levels. Nor does it make sense to set a direction that is a poor fit with the design 
elements, making it difficult to implement decisions once a direction has been established.· 
And most importantly, a poor fit between the organization and its environment can doom 
the organization to obsolescence or extinction. 
When organizational results do not meet expectations, the dominant coalition is of-
ten replaced with a new one. Charged with renewal and transformation, the new coalition 
begins anew to seek congruence as it cycles through the processes of direction setting, 
implementation, and evaluation. 
D. Necessary and Sufficient Elements in the Federal Government 
A brief review of some of the major laws, executive orders, and proposals pertaining to fed- . 
eral government management (Mosher 1976; Stillman 1982; Rosenbloom 1995) reveals· 
that all of the necessary and sufficient elements of strategic management have been ad-
dressed at some time or another (Table 3). Agency identity, established by the Constitution 
and the Declaration of Independence, has been updated as new agencies have been created 
(e.g., Health, Education and Welfare in 1953). Concerns over organizational technology or~ 
work flow have received a great deal of attention through the reengineering efforts spon-
sored by the National Performance Review. The structure of work has been the subject of 
many task forces and reorganization plans over the years. Subsystems, such as financial 
management, have received constant scrutiny. Human resource management has long been 
of interest, beginning with the Pendleton Act. Information management has generated 
growing concern as the computer revolution has opened up the potential for greater effi-
ciency in operations. The measurement of performance has been a central theme in both the 
National Performance Review and the Government Performance Results Act, as have the 
issues of direction setting. 
Despite the attention to the necessary and sufficient elements, some of it relatively 
recent, the implementation of many of these elements has been incomplete. Since the im-
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Table 3 Laws, Executive Orders, and Reports Establish Necessary and Sufficient Elements for 
Strategic Management in the Federal Governmenta 
Necessary elements 
Mandates establish identities and boundaries 
Constitution lays out governance structure based on separation of power, 1789 
Federal administrative agencies created, 1789 
Bureau of the Budget created, 1912 
Office of the Comptroller General and General Accounting Office set up, 1921 
Division of the Executive Office of the President set up, 1939 
National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency established, 1949 
Health, Education, and Welfare created, 1953 
Technology establishes work processes (e.g., routine-nonroutine) 
National Performance Review challenges federal government to reinvent and reengineer its 
work processes, 1993 
Tasks specify work activities of personnel within work processes (tasks often implied in mandates) 
Executive Order No. 8248 assigns functions and duties within the divisions of the Executive 
Office of the President, 1939 
Administrative Procedure Act sets up rule-making procedures, 1946 
Structure integrates tasks (by function, by geography, by product, by market, by project) 
Brownlow Report recommends restructuring of executive branch, 1937 
National Security Act reorganizes Department of Defense, 1947, 1949 
First Hoover Commission Reorganization (Price Report), 1964 
Bureau of Budget Circular A-95 coordinates federal assistance programs, 1969 
Reorganization Plan No. 2 creates Domestic Council to coordinate policy, formulation, 1972 
Subsystems link the components 
Financial and capital management allocate resources and maintain assets 
Taft Commission on Economy and Efficiency establishes the need for a national budget, 1912 
Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 
Brownlow Committee reports on fiscal management, 1937 
Government Corporation Control Act seeks to provide more controls over federal corpora-
tions, 1945 
First Hoover Commission recommends changes in fiscal management, 1949 
Budget and Accounting Procedures Act authorizes the president to determine the form of the 
federal budget, 1950 
Bureau of Budget Bulletin No. 66-3 implements planning-programming-budgeting, 1965 
OMB Bulletin No. 77-9 instructs on zero-based budgeting, 1977 
Executive Order 12369 (Grace Commission) examines private sector methods of cost control 
and ways to reduce costs, 1982 
Packard Commission Report reforms the Defense Department's acquisition system, 1986 
Chief Financial Officer's Act establishes financial accountability and responsibility with 
chief financial officers, 1993 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, 1994 
Federal Acquisition Reform Act emphasizes the use of commercial products and practices, 
1996 
Human resource management attends to the needs of personnel 
Civil Service (Pendleton) Act creates the Civil Service Commission and prescribes methods 
for appointments to the civil service, 1883 
Classification Act establishes compensation schedules, etc., 1923 
Brownlow Committee suggests changes in personnel management, 1937 
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Table 3 Continued 
Second Hoover Commission Report defines Senior Civil Service, 1955 
Executive Order 11246 specifies nondiscrimination in employment, 1965 
Ink Report seeks to reform the Civil Service, 1977 
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Civil Service Reform Act creates a merit system, Office of Personnel Management, and Se-
nior Executive Service, 1978 
Information management collects, analyzes, and communicates data 
Brooks Act establishes regulations for purchasing of automated data processing (ADP) equip-
ment and creates Federal Information Management Regulations, 1964 
Freedom of Information Act establishes a policy of providing information to the public, 1974 
Paperwork Reduction Act, 1995 
Information Technology Management Reform Act requires agencies to appoint a chief infor-
mation officer, 1996 
Performance measures provide the capability to assess results 
National Performance Review focus on results-driven government, 1993 
Government Performance Results Act requires performance measures, 1993 
Sufficient elements 
Dominant coalition leads the organization 
Consensus emerges on organization's direction 
Government Performance Results Act views goal setting as a collaborative process, 1993 
Changes based on prior performance made to organization (direction, design factors) 
a This list is intended to be illustrative, not comprehensive. 
plications differ, depending on the approach to strategic management being employed, each 
approach is examined separately. 
E. Directive Approach 
With the exception of the National Performance Review, most of the recommendations and 
changes emanating from the necessary and sufficient elements listed in Table 3 support. and 
reinforce the directive approach to strategic management. The executive branch, for exam-
ple, is to be centralized in order to enhance the president's role as the manager of govern-
ment agencies and to promote greater rationality in organization and operations (e.g., 
Brownlow and First Hoover Commission). A strict hierarchical authority structure from 
president to agency heads, agency heads to agency managers, agency managers to agency 
employees, is necessary to maintain order and keep people accountable. Rules and regula-
tions enable centralized service agencies to control work activities and to provide addi~ 
tional means of ensuring accountability (e.g., Budgeting and Accounting Act, Chief Fi~ 
nancial Officer's Act, Brooks Act). Comprehensive, top-down, rational-analytic planning 
systems are essential in linking all organizational units in order to coordinate their efforts 
toward common ends (e.g., PPBS). A strict division of labor, with formalized, standard-
ized, and specialized jobs, is necessary to guarantee efficiency of operations and to ensure 
a competent work force independent of political influence (e.g., Civil Service Act, Civil 
Service Reform Act). 
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A review of the efforts to address the necessary and sufficient elements, however, de-
scribes the very sad state of the directive approach within and across federal agencies. For 
example, federal information technology projects over the past decade have had serious 
problems. According to Gene Dodaro, assistant comptroller general, the picture is "bleak": 
"Multimillion dollar and, in some cases, billion dollar system development efforts routinely 
came in over cost, behind schedules, and lacking in promised capabilities. In addition to 
wasting resources, these disappointed efforts seriously weakened agencies' abilities to 
meet mission goals and improve operational efficiency" (Dodaro 1997:1). Despite the ex-
penditure of over $200 billion over the 12 years prior to 1995, "reviews of major system 
modernization efforts across the government ... have shown that many federal agencies 
are still automating existing ways of doing business" without analyzing and redesigning 
current business process (Dodaro 1995). 
Financial management is another troubled subsystem of strategic management. 
According to Charles Bowsher, comptroller general of the United States, "seriously inade-
quate financial management systems are currently the greatest barrier to timely and mean-
ingful financial reporting" (1995a: 18). Most agencies are "not capable of readily produc-
ing annual financial statements and are not in compliance with current systems standards" 
(p. 19). Consequently, "agency managers do not have reliable, timely financial data 
throughout the year to help manage effectively" (p. 19). Unfortunately that assessment had 
not changed as of 1997 (Hinchman 1997). Human resource management fares no better: 
"The complexity of the system and the variety of redress mechanisms it affords federal 
employees make it inefficient, expensive, and time-consuming," according to Timothy 
Bowling (1996), associate director of the General Government Division of the General Ac-
counting Office (GAO). 
Agency structures are another weakness. Many have accumulated responsibilities 
without regard to their coordination and integration. As of October 1994, for example, the 
federal government funded over 90 early childhood programs in 11 federal agencies and 20 
offices. The Department of Health and Human Services ran 28 of these, and the Department 
of Education ran 34. Thirteen programs targeted economically disadvantaged children from 
birth through age 5, meaning that a disadvantaged child potentially could have been eligi-
ble for as many as 13 federal programs. The federal food safety system, evolving from 35 
laws administered by 12 different agencies, does not protect the public from major airborne 
illnesses. Its basic structure lacks coherence because it was created and continues to oper-
ate in a piecemeal fashion in response to specific heath threats from particular food prod-
ucts. Efforts to deal with food safety issues are thus encumbered by "inconsistent oversight 
and enforcement authorities, inefficient resource use, ineffective coordination efforts, and 
inflexible and outdated inspection practices" (Bowsher 1995b). 
Two conditions essential for the use of the directive approach are particularly trou-
blesome and they are dealt with in depth: the measurement of results and the development 
of a dominant coalition and a consensus on organizational direction. The analysis focuses 
on the Government Performance Results Act (1993), which addresses both of these condi-
tions in depth. 
1. Results 
Defining results and measuring them have been difficult tasks for federal managers. No 
common indicators of performance comparable to their private sector counterparts, such as 
profits, sales, or return on investments, exist. Each agency or program has to develop its 
own indicators, a time-consuming and difficult process. Rather than face these challenges, 
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the norm in the past has been to rely on input measures and process measures, such as bud-
get expenditures, activity levels, and staffing numbers. These indicators are poor substi-
tutes for outcome measures, however. They gauge how agencies are executing their mis-
sions rather than what they are really accomplishing and achieving. 
The Government Performance Results Act (GPRA), enacted in August 1993, tackles 
the problem of measurement head-on. As Walter Groszyk (1995) of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB) noted, "What GPRA seeks to create is the government's counter-
part to the business 'bottom line"' (p. 4). All 14 cabinet departments, virtually all agencies, 
and all government corporations were challenged to define their measures of performance 
in terms of results, not in terms of processes, and to explain how they would use that in-
formation to make improvements through annual performance plans. An initial Annual 
Performance Plan was to be submitted to OMB in September 1997 in support of the fiscal 
year 1999 budget. The performance plans were to cover each program activity in the 
agency's budget, with specific performance indicators that focus on program outputs and 
outcomes. Beginning no later than March 31, 2000, and filed by March 31 of each suc-
ceeding year, annual program performance reports would set forth the performance indica-
tors, goals, and actual performance for at least the preceding 3 years. The performance re-
ports are to review successful performance, identify unsuccessful performance, describe 
any remedial action that may be required, and recommend appropriate changes to perfor-
mance goals in subsequent fiscal years. 
Experts in performance measurement acknowledge how difficult it is to develop 
meaningful measures of results, especially in government, and offer a range of suggestions 
on how to deal with these difficulties (Joyce 1993; Boschken 1994; Kravchuk and Schack 
1996). With these difficulties in mind and in order to give agencies some practice in de-
veloping their measures of performance and preparing for a results-driven federal govern-
ment, GPRA began a phased implementation approach to build experience and provide 
lessons. It required a minimum of 10 pilot projects to provide a broad and diverse experi-
ence with the tenets of the law. The pilots were to be designated and orchestrated by OMB 
and scheduled during fiscal years 1994 through 1996. A total of 77 pilots, including 9 
agency-level pilots such as the Defense Logistics Agency and the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, and program-level pilots such as the Department of Veteran Affairs Loan Guaranty 
Program, eventually participated at some point during this period. When the first sets of pi-
lots concluded at the end of fiscal year 1996, a total of 68 representing 28 agencies re-
mained as participants (U.S. GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-97-109). 
The Results Act also required OMB to select a second set of pilot projects during fis-
cal years 1995 through 1996. They were to determine the effects of providing managers of 
federal programs with increased managerial flexibility in exchange for greater account-
ability. A third set of pilot projects, scheduled for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, would test 
performance budgeting-i.e., the presentation of the varying levels of performance that 
would result from different budget levels. 
Case studies of the pilots (National Academy of Public Administration 1994; Stevens 
1996) reveal a number of difficulties managers encountered when attempting to devise 
performance indicators and measure results. Many agencies were still measuring activities 
and continued to struggle with devising outcome measures. In 1994, for example, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) was counting activities such as the 
numbers of safety and health standards promulgated, federal and state inspections con-
ducted, criminal prosecutions referred, training grants supported, and consultation visits 
conducted (U.S. GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-97-109). OMB found that in about 20% of the per-
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formance plans it reviewed, the measures were not precise enough to be used in management 
and budgeting (Finch 1995). As an example, although the Public Housing Management As-
sessment program in Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has a system that collects 
data, it does not collect data on housing quality or quality of maintenance, which, according 
to GAO, are essential for assessing results and determining which housing authorities are· 
performing well or poorly (U.S. GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-97-109:34). GAO's survey of fed-
eral managers suggests that this was not an isolated occurrence in federal agencies (U.S. 
GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-97-109). Federal managers reported that overall, results-oriented 
performance information was often not available, and when available, frequently was not 
used to make important agency and program decisions. Although 76% of federal managers 
government wide reported that their programs, project, or operations had performance mea-
sures, these measures were not results-oriented (U.S. GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-97-109). 
Experience in measurement revealed a number of other technical and analytic chal-
lenges. Different parties use different definitions to measure performance across levels of 
government, such as in the case of child support enforcement, despite the fact that effective-
ness depends on coordination among federal, state, and local jurisdictions (U.S. GAO 1997, 
GAO/GGD-97-109:51). In other instances, key performance measures are computed differ-
ently in different agencies, making it difficult to compare the relative effectiveness of indi-
vidual programs in "crosscutting programs" (U.S. GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-97-109:51). Re-
liance on outside parties (e.g., states) that administer federal programs makes it difficult to 
obtain accurate data. For example, the Department of Education faced difficulty in obtaining 
accurate data from adult education programs in the states because of double counting or un-
dercounting of students in adult education programs. Thus, even when data are collected, their 
reliability and validity are often questionable (U.S. GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-97-109:50). 
Agency results can also be influenced by external forces beyond their control, such as 
broad national economic trends and assistance from state and local governments and the pri-
vate sector. "Isolating the federal contribution to the achievement of an intended result has 
been exceedingly difficult and accordingly has hindered agency efforts to identify meaningful 
performance measures" (U.S. GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-97-109:48). Regulatory agencies espe-
cially have difficulty in sorting out the interaction that external factors have on their results and 
accordingly have had problems in identifying meaningful performance measures. For exam-
ple, OSHA data are sometimes influenced by catastrophic events, such as bombings or airplane 
crashes, factors over which OSHA has no control. To achieve their results some agencies also 
need long time frames, which make annual performance measure difficult. It may take years 
to see the results of the programs' activities. Latency periods between the exposure to a haz-
ardous substance, such as asbestos, and a resulting illness could be 20 years. Research and de-
velopment programs also have had particular difficulties in identifying the impacts of their re-
search and have had to use a number of proxy measures, none of which is readily adaptable for 
the purposes of the Results Act (U.S. GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-97-109:50). 
Thus, as GAO reports, the pilot phase "underscores how far organizations still have 
to progress in the development and use of results-oriented performance information" (U.S. 
GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-97-109:37). "The challenges confronting agencies as they seek to 
develop useful results-oriented performance information are substantial, long-standing, 
and will not be quickly or easily resolved" (U.S. GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-97-109:56). 
2. Dominant Coalition and Consensus 
Added to the technical problems of defining and measuring results in the federal govern-
ment is the difficulty in linking them to the organization's overall direction. Direction set-
ting depends on the extent to which a dominant coalition exists and has achieved a con-
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sensus on the direction the agency or program should pursue. To the extent that a consensus 
exists, agency planning can proceed and is less problematic. To the extent that a coalition 
has not yet emerged, nor a consensus been reached, direction setting becomes a political pro-
cess reliant on negotiation and conflict management. To paraphrase David Rosenbloom, we 
cannot assume that measurement will be a substitute for political choice (1995)._ 
Again, the Results Act to help us illustrate the challenges of direction setting in the 
federal government. The act required agencies to submit their strategic plans to the direc-
tor of OMB and to Congress by September 30, 1997. The strategic plans were to include a 
comprehensive mission statement, a description of general goals and objectives and the op-
erational processes required to meet these goals, a description of performance outcomes di-
rectly related to goals, and a description of program evaluations to assist goal revisions as 
appropriate. The initial plan was to cover a period of not less than 5 years, computed for-
ward from the fiscal year when it was submitted and updated at least once every 3 years. 
The agency also was required to consult Congress in formulating the strategic plan and con-
sider the other affected stakeholders (i.e. the customers). In fact, agencies were to document 
disagreements pertaining to agency goals to ensure there was an opportunity for stake-
holders to have a voice in the decision-making process. 
It is through consultations with key stakeholders, most notably those in Congress and 
those on the oversight committees, that the act addresses the political challenge of direction set-
ting, although there is no mention of what constitutes a consultation, when it should occur, and 
with whom (Stevens 1997). As noted by GAO, "The requirement for consultations is ... per-
haps the Results Act's most significant challenge, because consultations will likely raise con-
tentious policy issues that are inherent in the political process" (U.S. GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-
97-109:43). It acknowledges that since direction setting requires making hard choices, "there 
may be disagreement between the agency and key stakeholders about particular goals or the 
means by which the goals will be achieved" (U.S. GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-97-109:44). 
Evidence of contention already exists, especially as agencies attempt to balance mul-
tiple priorities within individual agencies. For example, disagreements. have surfaced within 
the Forest Service and among key external stakeholders, including Congress, on how it is to 
make choices among competing uses of its lands (e.g., promoting timber sales versus pro-
moting wildlife). According to GAO, these conflicts "seriously undermined its ability to _es-
tablish goals and performance measures needed to ensure its accountability" (U.S. GAO 
1997, GAO/GGD-97-109:42). Other instances have been noted. A congressional staff mem-
ber reported that "major disagreements existed between the political parties as to the basic 
direction of an agency under his committee's jurisdiction" (Stevens 1997:6). "When sub-
committee staff met with this agency's officials, the discussion quickly became quite con-
frontational, and the session only served to reinforce tensions rather than resolve them" 
(Stevens 1997:6). These difficulties perhaps explain why those managers with experience 
with the Results Act report greater difficulties in reconciling competing views. For example, 
"58% of managers in selected Results Act pilots reported that reconciling differing con-
gressional views has been or will be somewhat to very difficult, compared to 46% of man- . 
agers in all other federal agencies. Similarly, 59% of managers in selected Results Act pilots 
reported that reconciling the views of other parties has been or will be somewhat to very dif-
ficult, compared to 48 percent of federal managers of all other agencies" (U.S. GAO 1997, , 
GAO/GGD-97-109:42). These differences are statistically significant. 
The potential for conflict may, in fact, account for the few consultations that have oc-
curred up to this point. Most committee staff and agency officials, particularly committee 
staff, have stressed the very limited nature of the meetings thus far, characterizing them as 
briefings, preconsultations, or preliminary consultations. There also have been differing 
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views on the level of detail during the consultations. It was the general impression of some 
agency officials that the consultations were only to concern agency mission and strategic 
goals. Most committee staff, on the other hand, believed that agencies also should be pre-
pared to provide information on programmatic issues and measures (Stevens 1997:10). 
Despite some progress, there have been difficulties in developing the capacity for the 
planning process itself. The learning curve bas been steep as a result of a number of factors. 
First of all, developing and sustaining top-level agency commitment has been difficult. There 
is a high turnover rate among political appointees; the medium tenure in large agencies is about 
2 years (Finch 1995). And some positions are vacant longer that they are filled. Committed and 
effective leadership, required to implement the Results Act, has been missing in many cases. 
Although a GAO survey found that about 57% of managers said their agency leadership 
demonstrated a strong commitment to achieving results to a great or very great extent, only 
about 16% said managers above their levels made program changes based on results-oriented 
performance information to a great or very great extent. So although the commitment to results 
may be there, its practice has been lacking (U.S. GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-97-109). 
The rewards, a significant element for any successful adaptation, have been missing 
as well. Less than half of federal managers reported positive recognition for achieving 
results (U.S. GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-97-109). Training personnel is also a factor. The Of-
fice of Personnel Management estimated in 1993 that there were more than 300,000 man-
agers in the federal system who would need to be trained in GPRA. Yet agencies have not 
developed or implemented an agencywide training strategy that identifies who needs to be 
trained, on what, how, and when. To compound the problem, increases in training budgets 
are not likely during this period of retrenchment (Finch 1995). 
Overlapping and fragmented program efforts also make direction setting difficult. 
They "prevent the logical need to coordinate efforts to ensure that goals are consistent and, 
as appropriate, that programs are mutually reinforcing" (U.S. GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-97-
109: 1). In response to national needs and problems, Congress and the executive branch have 
given responsibility for addressing national issues to many different agencies. For example, 
"of the 18 national missions or areas of national need described as budget fractions, 14 were 
addressed by more than 1 executive branch department or major agency in fiscal year 1996, 
such as health, international affairs, and justice. Six of the national missions, including edu-
cation, income security, and commerce and housing credit were addressed by six or more 
executive branch departments and major agencies" (U.S. GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-97-
109:38-39). The "crosscutting" problem becomes even more acute when examined at the 
program level. In the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, there are 342 economic de-
velopment-related programs administered by 13 agencies. It is difficult to coordinate so 
many programs, each with its own individual funding streams, application requirements, and 
reporting expectations. It is even more difficult for the "citizen-clients" to take advantage of 
the services when so many agencies are involved. For example, the Department of Educa-
tion programs provide student loans and grants to help finance higher education. Yet another 
22 smaller programs are targeted to specific segments of the same population, such as stu-
dents from disadvantaged families or women and minorities. During its review of major por-
tions of agencies' strategic plans in the summer of 1996, however, OMB found little sign of 
significant coordination among agencies (U.S. GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-97-109:40). 
These findings and the challenge of balancing multiple priorities within individual 
agencies prompted GAO to conclude: 
Although the Results Act provides a potentially effective vehicle for addressing these 
issues, their existence also makes the prospects for the effective govemmentwide im-
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plementation of the Act uncertain in the near term. Efforts under the Results Act can 
help identify the extent and consequences of the overlap and fragmentation, but ad-
dressing such problems will likely be a lengthy process, because Congress and the ex-
ecutive branch will have to consider policy trade-offs to reach a reasonable degree of 
consensus on the appropriate federal response to national needs. Similarly, balancing 
multiple priorities will need to be an ongoing process, because priorities change as new 
needs arise. (U.S. GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-97-109:45) 
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Unfortunately, making trade-offs is not what politicians are prone to do; nor are they 
particularly interested in establishing specific goals. As Donald Savoie emphasizes, gov-
ernment's "objectives are unclear because politicians prefer it that way" (quoted in Behn 
1996:18). "Clarifying objectives is managerially sound but politically irrational," com-
ments Bob Behn (1996:18). Clarification requires politicians to choose from among com-
peting constituencies and values. "From experience, elected officials have learned that they 
can win more praise, support, and votes by being fuzzy about what results it [sic] will pro-
duce by when than by being clear" (Behn 1996:18). Discussions about specific targets for 
specific programs for specific agencies for specific years causes problems. It 
reintroduces political disagreements that have been carefully minimized by incorporat-
ing the vague (rather than precise) purposes into the authorizing legislation. A legisla-
tive preamble that outlines general, multiple, and perhaps even contradictory purposes 
can make a lot of people happy. The purposes set forth in legislation are not multiple 
and general because no legislator had a clear idea of what goal he or she wanted to 
achieve; rather, the preamble contains multiple, general purposes because, although 
many legislators could identify one or more specific goals to be achieved, they could 
not agree on a few common ones. (Behn 1996: 18) 
That point is reflected in the comments of one OMB official, who noted that "a strategic 
plan that achieved complete agreement among all interested parties was likely to be at such 
a high level of generality that its usefulness as a decision making tool would be fairly lim-
ited" (U.S. GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-97-109:44). 
F. The Adaptive Approach 
The introduction of the adaptive approach to the federal government is a recent phe~ 
. nomenon, at least on a governmentwide basis. Although some agencies such as the 
National Aeronautics and Space (NASA) have had a longer history with this approach 
(Webb 1969; Levine 1982; Roberts 2000), Vice President Gore's announcement of the Na-
tional Performance Review (NPR) in 1993 alerted other agencies and the nation to its pos-
sibilities. Since we believe the NPR captures the essence of the adaptive approach, our anal-
ysis centers on it. We begin with a brief summary of the NPR's basic principles drawn from 
a series of reports, recommendations, legislative proposals, and executive orders. 1 We then 
address the larger question of interest: To what extent do its basic principles address the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for strategic management practice in the federal gov-
ernment? 
1. Basic Principles of the National Performance Review 
The bedrock principle of NPR is performance-based government. Complementing the 
GPRA, the NPR seeks to substitute outcome measures that focus on results for process 
measures that focus on activities. Both reform packages shine the spotlight on agency per-
formance. In contrast to GPRA, however, the NPR defines results in customer terms. Cus-
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tomer needs and satisfaction become the determinants of agency direction. Rather than 
looking to Congress and the larger set of stakeholders for guidance, thereby opening up a 
whole host of issues, as we saw in GPRA, agencies can narrow the scope of possibilities 
and simplify the direction setting process by honing in on what their customers value. Per-
formance-based and customer-oriented government thus creates a marketlike mechanism 
to regulate agency activity. A basic assumption of NPR is that if agencies are meeting cus-
tomer needs, they can stay in "business." 
To support this marketlike structure, the president delegates authority to agency ex-
ecutives. A written performance contract for each agency eliminates the "one size fits all" 
mentality and allows each agency to meet the unique needs of its customer base. Direction 
setting at the presidential level is broad to give agencies flexibility and room to maneuver, 
and direction setting within the agency rests on a vision open enough to invite employee in-
novation and entrepreneurship (Gore 1994b). 
Employee entrepreneurship is critical because employees are closer to customers 
than anyone. They have the up-to-date knowledge on what customers want and are 
in the best position to listen to them and signal what changes should be made to accom-
modate their needs. Employees therefore have to be empowered, trained, and rewarded 
so they can serve as the vanguard of change, either to improve agency procedures con-
tinuously or to reengineer the work flow radically by applying the new information 
technologies. 
Decentralized authority and an empowered work force are possible to the extent that 
agencies have been released from red tape and central service agency controls. Financial 
and human resource management subsystems (e.g., budgeting, procurement, personnel) 
need to be streamlined to permit greater latitude in agency operations and to provide 
incentives for risk taking and innovation. Inspectors general need to broaden their focus 
from strict compliance auditing to evaluation of management control systems. Reinvention 
labs, now numbering over 300 throughout the federal government, serve as the hub of ex-
perimentation. The labs can apply for waivers to release them from centralized procedures, 
and the lessons learned from their successes as well as failures can serve as examples for 
others. 
Agency structures also need to be realigned to be compatible with an empowered 
work force and a customer orientation. Flatter structures and crosscutting ventures built 
around reengineered work processes supported by self-managed teams can meet customer 
needs faster and better than functionally designed hierarchical structures staffed with peo-
ple in narrowly defined jobs. Hierarchies create boundaries within the agency and between 
the agency and its external stakeholders. The boundaries are impediments to the flow of in-
formation and the coordination of work, and hence, limit responsiveness. 
Breaking down boundaries in other domains is important as well. Partnerships with 
businesses have a number of benefits. Experiencing the management revolution much 
earlier than government, businesses can serve as a source of information and encourage-
ment. Purchase of commercial products can save money. Market mechanisms can be 
useful in solving problems related to pollution, housing, worker safety, and health. Creat-
ing market dynamics by making service organizations compete in noncore missions with 
one another and with the private sector can reduce government costs and improve perfor-
mance. Performance partnerships with state and local governments can realize similar 
benefits: Programs can be consolidated; financial incentives can help states and localities 
achieve program goals; the locus of decision making can shift from federal to state and 
local administrators; increased flexibility can permit greater experimentation for state and 
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local governments; accountability can be based on results; and administrative savings can 
be anticipated. In fact, it is these boundary-breaking proposals that most resemble the 
Republican Contract with America (Gingrich and Army 1994). ' 
To finance these much-needed reforms, agencies are to eliminate unnecessary field 
offices and duplicative services, consolidate their programs, raise user fees, collect delin-
quent funds, eliminate fraud, invest in innovation funds for long-term productivity in-
creases, and reengineer programs to reduce costs. 
2. The Necessary and Sufficient Elements in Practice 
The NPR offers a coherent theoretical statement about the necessary and sufficient ele-
ments for strategic management in the federal government, certainly from the perspective 
of the adaptive approach. Implementation into practice has been another matter. Although 
its successes have been numerous (Gore 1994a; 1995; 1996), its transfer into practice has 
been and will be limited by a number of factors. 
Despite its advantage of marketlike incentives based on customer needs, the problem 
of accountability has been only partially solved. The line of accountability that extends 
from the president to agency executives through managers and employees and ultimately 
to agency customers minimizes active involvement by other key stakeholders in the direc-
tion setting process. Noncustomer citizens can hold the president accountable only through 
elections every 4 years. If they object to an agency's direction, their recourse is to tum to 
Congress. Congressional representatives, however, are to hold federal agencies account-
able only by monitoring agency results and controlling their budget. They are not expected 
to be heavily involved in agency direction setting. Thus, the direction setting process in fed-
eral agencies becomes the primary responsibility of the executive branch, not the Congress,' 
a point of contention between the two branches of government that has a long history 
(Fisher 1993; Foreman 1995). Attempting to make the direction setting process less con-
tentions and more businesslike, by minimizing potentially disruptive influences from non-
customer citizens and Congress, risks creating a backlash that likely will provoke even 
more political effects in the future. 
Limiting the number of stakeholders in the direction setting process also does not 
solve the problem of identifying and measuring performance. The technical challenge of 
measuring results, as mentioned in the context of the directive approach, remains: And 
most importantly, developing a consensus on agency direction to clarify what results will 
be pursued cannot be guaranteed. Agency customers do not always agree on what they want 
from an agency, as demonstrated with the example of the Forest Service. Agreement within · 
the executive branch and within each federal agency also cannot be assumed. NASA is a 
prime example. It was spectacularly successful in achieving Kennedy's vision of landing 
on the moon, but subsequent administrations and personnel within NASA could not agree 
in the 1970s and 1980s on a new vision for its future. The consequences were disastrous for 
NASA and the nation (Marx et al. 1990). This level of dissensus can be expected within 
other agencies as well. When political appointees change every few years (Finch 1995) and 
disrupt agency continuity, and when they hold more and more leadership positions in pro-
portion to civil service employees (Light 1995), reaching agreement on agency direction is 
not easy. Performance-based agencies require a consensus on the direction they will pur-
sue· and the results they will be expected to achieve. Even without direct noncustomer 
stakeholder and congressional involvement, there is no evidence to suggest that conflicts 
can be prevented. As is the GRP A; the NPR is silent on what happens when consensus can-
not be reached. 
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The problems with coordination within agencies, across federal agencies, and among 
the federal, state, and local levels of government could be eased with the enactment of 
many NPR proposals. Devolving responsibility for performance to lower levels could re-
lease the president and agency heads from the burden of coordinating very large and com-
plex systems, especially during periods of dramatic change, when centralized coordination 
becomes very difficult (Galbraith 1973; Kiel 1994). Decentralization could also encourage 
governmental entities to make independent adjustments to their operations as long as they 
stay within the bounds of their performance contracts established with higher authority. 
Their responses to environmental threats and opportunities could be quick and specific to 
local circumstances. Substituting performance contracts for centralized financial and hu-
man resource management controls could have the additional advantage of releasing the 
creative talents of government employees at all levels. Through their entrepreneurship and 
innovation they could find more effective means to accomplish their missions. Despite 
these features, decentralization has raised objections from many quarters. 
Objections at the federal level have come from Congress, parent organizations, 
centralized service agencies within the executive branch, and unions (Roberts, A. 1997). 
The reasons for their opposition vary. Some consider the relaxation of centralized controls 
over financial and personnel processes an invitation to disaster. They fear an increase in the 
level of waste, fraud, and abuse and therefore worry about accountability. Parent organiza-
tions resist a loss of business from captive departments that must use their services. Unions 
object to losing their protections under the law. Legal authorities warn of the problems that 
would confront an appropriation-funded performance-based organization during a bud-
getary deadlock and question the constitutionality of contract-based employment. Media-
sensitive observers raise issues about the practicality of radically new pay and bonus pack- . 
ages in the goldfish bowl of public life (Roberts, A. 1997). There are also issues of cost. 
Decentralized systems do not necessarily save money. Entrepreneurship and innovation 
require slack time and resources; experimentation does not come cheap nor does it always 
produce useful or good results. Failure must be tolerated to encourage future risk taking 
behavior (Quinn 1996), a position not particularly appealing in periods of downsizing and 
retrenchment when cutting expenses is a political priority. 
Under the weight of these criticisms and opposition, it is not surprising that there 
have been delays in putting forward bills that would establish performance-based organi-
zations. With the exception of procurement laws, as of September 1996, Congress had 
failed to adopt many of the NPR' s recommendations that would make decentralization a re-
ality: reduction of overitemization in appropriation accounts (recommendation BGT03); 
elimination of employment ceilings and floors (BGT04); conversion to multiyear appro-
priations and permits to carry-forwards (BGT07); broadband classification systems 
(HRM02), performance management programs (HRM03), or incentive systems (HRM04); 
elimination of the GPO and GSA service monopolies (SUPOl) and (SUP08) (Gore 1996). 
Ill. COMPARISON OF APPROACHES 
Table 4 compares the two approaches to strategic management in the federal government 
in terms of the necessary and sufficient elements. The directive approach, as exemplified 
in GPRA, and the adaptive approach, as, exemplified in NPR, offer two very different 
views on how the government should be strategically managed. Federal agencies under 
GPRA are expected to be bureaucratic in the Weberian sense (1947). Built on a ratio-
nal-analytic foundation, technologies are to be kept as routine as possible, with specialized, 
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Table 4 Comparison of the Directive and Adaptive Approaches to Government 






Tasks Specialized and functionally 
defined 
Reengineered around work processes 




Tasks organized by 
function; centralized 
decision making 
Centralized to support top 
management control 
Outcome-based; 
Tasks organized by projects and 
programs; decentralized decision 
making 
Performance 
measures measures apply across the 
board 
Decentralized to support unit 
autonomy and control 
Outcome-based; measures uniquely 
designed for each performance 
contract 
standardized, and functionally defined tasks. Organizational structure requires centraliza-
tion and groupings by function, and centralized subsystems such as personnel are devel-
oped to provide organizationwide support. Performance measures are to be outcome-based, 
and agency exe.cutives are expected to forge a consensus with their key stakeholders in 
Congress on the direction to be pursued and the changes to be made. 
Federal agencies under NPR are expected to be entrepreneurial. Technology is to be 
reengineered around basic work processes, and jobs are to be enlarged, redesigned, and 
team-based in order to be compatible with the new work flow. Organizational structure is 
to be decentralized and flattened, and groupings are to be based on projects and programs. 
Subsystems are to be reinvented and decentralized to support local unit autonomy and con-
trol. Performance measures must be outcome-based to reflect customer needs, and agency 
executives are expected to forge a customer-oriented consensus with the president on the 
direction they will pursue and the changes they will make. 
Reality gets the way of both approaches, however. Table 5 summarizes the chal-
lenges each approach confronts in practice. As with all centralized systems, the directive 
Table 5 Challenges in Practice 
GPRA 
Coordination in centralized structures that 
overwhelms those at the top, especially 
during periods of rapid change 
Poorly developed financial management 
system 
Poorly developed information management 
system 
Results that focus on process measures and 
transition to outcome measures are slow 
Direction setting that depends on a dominant 
coalition 
Necessity for a dominant coalition to agree on 
changes to be made 
NPR 
Decentralization checked by those who fear 
loss of control and greater expense 
Poorly developed financial management 
system 
Poorly developed information management 
system 
Results focus on customers, neglecting other 
key stakeholders, e.g., Congress 
Direction setting that depends on a domimant 
coalition 
Necessity for a dominant coalition to agree on 
changes to be made 
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approach puts top-level executives in a bind. When the system they manage increases in 
size and complexity, they can no longer process the information that is funneled to them 
from the lower-level units (Galbraith 1973). As they suffer information overload, their de-
cisions are untimely, often inappropriate. They begin to fail as the center of coordination; 
their entire system then bogs down and becomes less efficient. The First Hoover Commis-
sion Report (1949) recognized the problem: "There is a limit .. . in the size and complex-
ity of Government beyond which it is no longer feasible to furnish services centrally with-
out creating serious bottlenecks, delays, and confusion"; it noted also, "this point has long 
been reached in the operations of the Federal Government" (Mosher 1976: 215). 
Unfortunately GPRA opens up the prospect of greater centralization, but this time it 
is in the legislative rather than the executive branch. Additional staff and support services 
will be required to assist Congress in its oversight of agency strategic plans, yearly perfor-
mance reports, and operating budgets. Drawn deeper and deeper into organizational issues 
through the consultative process, Congress will begin to take on what were formally agency 
responsibilities. The temptation will be too great to stay on the sidelines and control only 
through the budgetary process. The justification, as with all centralized systems, will be to 
intervene in order to ensure accountability at its lower levels and to bring rationality to the 
maze of ill-structured and poorly coordinated programs. At some point, with greater and 
greater responsibilities, Congress will be unable to keep up with the agencies' information 
processing requirements. The problem will be compounded should environmental changes 
prompt agencies to demand even faster response times. "Bottlenecks, delays, and confu-
sion" are the likely consequence. 
The directive approach also suffers from poorly developed subsystems, especially 
financial and information management subsystems, and none of the corrections is a quick 
fix. Accountability will continue to be weak because of reliance on process indicators 
rather than outcome indicators. Although experimentation in pilots has demonstrated that 
some of the technical problems in measuring performance can be overcome, the political 
problems will continue to be troublesome. Performance-based agencies require a consen-
sus on direction to define and measure results. Yet the GPRA pilot studies indicate that the 
plans will be "mixed" and "highly uneven" (U.S. GAO 1997, GAO/GGD-97-109). A con-
sensus will not always be forthcoming in a divided or a shared power system of governance 
that tolerates and protects competing values. Without consensus, agencies unfortunately 
will lack the sufficient elements of strategic management. 
The adaptive approach, as exemplified in the NPR, does not fare much better in prac-
tice. A work in progress (Kettl 1995), the NPR fights against the assumptions and realities 
of the directive approach, which still holds most agencies captive. The switch from the di-
rective approach, which requires control and order, to the adaptive approach, which prizes 
flexibility and entrepreneurship, requires radical, discontinuous, transformational change 
(Nadler et al. 1995). Transformation is difficult enough in large and complex businesses 
(Ashkenas et al. 1995; Kotter 1995), but it is monumentally difficult in state governments 
(Roberts and King 1996), even more so in national governments, as the experiments in New 
Zealand, Australia, and Britain attest (Mascarenhas 1993; Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 1997). 
Certainly, the adaptive approach's position on decentralization is much more rea-
sonable than the top-down, centralized approach of GPRA, especially given the size and 
complexity of most federal agencies and the level of environmental turbulence they con-
front. Certainly, the interagency committees and the President's Management Council will 
provide some coordination. However, attempts to devolve authority have been checked by 
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those who fear loss of control, resources, and protected status. Changes in centralized sub-
systems, especially human resources and financial management, have been delayed as a re-
sult of opposition from various quarters, making decentralization more of a hope than a re-
ality. Attempts to finesse the problems of performance measurement by focusing on 
customers, instead of other contentious stakeholders in Congress, leave the NPR vulnera-
ble on many counts, not least of which are democratic accountability to the president and a 
larger set of stakeholders, and renewal of the fight over which branch of government will 
control federal agencies (Arnold 1995; Caiden 1994; Carroll 1995; 1996; 1997; Carroll and 
Lynn 1996; Fox 1996; Frederickson 1996; 1997; Ingraham 1997; Kettl 1995; Meir 1997; 
Moe 1994; Moe and Gilmour 1995; Rosenbloom 1993; Thompson and Ingraham 1996). 
And most importantly from our perspective, the NPR still does not solve the problem of 
what to do when consensus on direction is not forthcoming to ensure the sufficient condi-
tions of strategic management. 
The overview of the necessary and sufficient elements of strategic management in the 
federal government from the perspectives of the directive and adaptive approaches has 
been revealing. Both approaches suffer from the incomplete implementation of the neces-
sary elements. The inability to manage finances and information and to define and measure 
performance is as limiting to one as it is to the other. By all accounts, it would appear that 
strategic management at the federal level whether viewed from the directive or the adap-
tive approach is still locked into phase 1 in the evolution of strategic management (Gluck 
et al. 1982). 
If this were the only issue, there would be some cause for optimism. There is mea-
sured progress being made on the necessary conditions thanks to both GPRA and NPR.2 
There is a recognition that agency management is a serious matter, a welcome change from 
previous focus on policy-making and analysis. What is more unsettling, however, is the 
lack of attention to the sufficient elements. Federal agencies are embedded in a political 
context; they are often pulled apart by competing values in a divided government that con-
stitutionally requires power sharing among the various branches and levels in the formula-
tion and implementation of policy (Bryson and Einsweiler 1991; Fisher 1993). Despite the 
emphasis on consultations with Congress and a focus on customers, what happens when an 
agency lacks a dominant coalition to guide its activities? What happens if a dominant coali-
tion is unable to agree on agency direction? Without a consensus, then what? It would ap-
pear that the current experimentation on strategic management in the federal government 
hinges on the ability to forge a consensus with no mention of what will happen if a con-
sensus fails to emerge. 
IV. THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS 
The search for consensus in federal government agencies may be like the quest for the holy 
grail-difficult, elusive, and impossible if one does not hold the proper beliefs and values. 
After all, our system of governance assumes conflict and establishes a framework to man-
age differences that are considered to be a natural part of the democratic process. Perhaps 
we should just accept that conflict will always be with us; that barring consensus, some fed-
eral agencies will just have to surrender the hope of greater efficiency and effectiveness be-
cause no one can agree on what they are supposed to do and how to do it. Perhaps. 
Instead of giving up on the prospects of moving beyond the political model in con-
flict-prone agencies, we think there is another way. Although acknowledging that it might 
582 Roberts and Menker 
be impossible to secure agreement if people's differences are truly fundamental and irrec-
oncilable, the option of developing an approach to strategic management that takes into ac-
count the constraints under which federal managers have to labor should at least be con-
sidered. The directive and adaptive approaches transferred from business may be 
conveniently available and have a logic that has been well tested in business settings, but 
they lack applicability when there is a weak or nonexistent political authority that can im-
pose "consensus" on the organization. Let us examine what an approach specifically de-
signed for consensus building in the federal government might look like. 
A. Networks 
Consensus building would begin with the acknowledgment that networks are a more 
appropriate unit of analysis than hierarchies or organizations, certainly not news to those 
who study policy networks (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) and issues networks (Heclo 
1978). Networks, defined as nodes connected by relations (Bradley and Roberts 1989), can 
be occupied by social actors ranging from individuals to organizations, nation-states, and 
international bodies, and they can cross public, private, and nonprofit sector lines at inter-
national, federal, state, and local levels, depending on the issue under question. Since 
government operations tend to be carried out in interorganizational, intersectoral, and 
multilevel domains that rarely have neat, well-defined boundaries to circumscribe activi-
ties, we suggest it is more appropriate to consider consensus building in networks than in 
organizations. 
In the U.S. shared power system of governance, the Congress makes the laws, the ex-
ecutive ensures that they are "faithfully executed," and the judiciary evaluates and resolves 
controversies to which they both may be a party. Thus, the steps in the strategic manage-
ment process (direction setting, implementation, and evaluation) are assumed by different 
institutions and responsibilities are dispersed among a number of different organizations. 
This arrangement is even more complicated by the inclusion of private and nonprofit ac-
tors. Citizens have input at various points of the policy formulation process. The govern-
ment subcontracts nonprofit and private sector organizations to implement and evaluate 
policy. The complexity increases as we factor in the set of governmental and nongovern-
mental relationships at the state and local levels that are part of the "coproduction" process, 
all operating with different authority and incentive structures. 
Contrast this complicated set of networked relations with what goes on in a private 
sector firm. Whether we consider a IO-person family-owned operation or a multinational 
corporation, the organization is the unit of analysis. All direction setting, implementation, 
and evaluation in the strategic management process occur under its auspices. No matter 
how many alliances, joint ventures, and contracts it establishes with outside social actors, 
the firm has a clearly defined organizational boundary that enables it to exercise authority 
and manipulate relationships to its advantage. 
Networks operate on a different set of principles (Powell 1991). The normative basis 
of their formations are the complementary strengths among the members. Social actors en-
gage in reciprocal, preferential, mutually supportive actions. The assumption is that "one 
party is dependent on resources controlled by another, and that there are gains to be had by 
the pooling of resources" (Powell 1991:272). Coming "into existence to deal with large-
scale issues that cannot be dealt with via existing organizations or mere inter-organizational 
cooperation" (Chisholm 1998:204), networks are a different form of organization from 
markets and hierarchies (Powell 1991; Williamson 1975). As such, we believe, they require 
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a different approach to consensus building, especially when considering the large number 
of participants in a network structure. 
B. Consensus Building and Planning in a Large Network 
1. Strategic Issues Management 
The strategic issues approach to consensus building and planning has been widely adopted 
and successfully used in networks (Bryson 1995; Nutt and Backoff 1992). Strategic issues 
are framed as questions of critical concern to participants in a direction setting effort. 
The only consensus required to begin the process is agreement on the important questions 
to ask (Roberts 1997). Consensus on goals is not recommended because it tends to work 
under limited conditions: narrowly defined mission; likelihood of broad and deep agree-
ment; sufficient goal specificity to guide strategy development; a hierarchical authority 
structure that empowers key decision makers to impose goals on those affected; externally 
imposed mandates to drive the direction setting process; a few powerful stakeholders; and 
participants who are relatively homogeneous and share a consensus on values (Bryson 
1995). The vision approach to strategic planning is not recommended either because it is 
primarily useful when a relatively short idealized scenario of the future can be developed; 
there is a good probability that key actors can agree on a vision; a holistic or integrated di-
rection is necessary; a new executive takes office, especially during a crisis; the social unit 
or units are not tightly constrained by mandates and conflicting expectations among nu-
merous stakeholders; and a homogeneous group of people share underlying value consen-
sus (Bryson 1995). 
In contrast to the goals and the vision approach to strategic planning, the strategic is-
sues approach is better suited when there is no agreement on goals, or the goals are too ab-
stract to be useful; there is no vision of success and developing a consensus-based vision 
will be difficult; there is no hierarchy that can impose goals on the stakeholders; the envi-
ronment is very turbulent and goal setting is difficult; the domain is partisan, politicized, 
and fragmented; and partial action to address key questions and issues is preferable to no 
action at all (Bryson 1995). In other words, the strategic issues approach to planning can 
work well when direction setting presents most problems. 
The strategic issues approach has another advantage. It can be specifically designed 
to address the tensions and paradoxes that threaten to pull people in many different direc-
tions at the same time (Nutt and Backoff 1992:127-145). Geared to assist participants in 
managing a world of competing values and priorities, it puts the paradoxical issues up front 
and center rather leaving them unaddressed. The intention is to help managers confront the 
reality of their circumstances, and in so doing, develop strategies that are a better fit with 
their context. One could envision a strategic issues planning session with federal agencies 
beginning with these, as yet, unexplored paradoxical questions, which are at the heart of the 
dilemma of introducing strategic management to the federal government: How can we ex-
ert the requisite control to manage our organizations strategically in a shared power system 
of governance that has been established to check our control and power? How can we be 
held accountable through a strict chain of command from elected representatives to orga-
nizational executives and managers and yet adapt to a changing environment that necessi-
tates individual and agency flexibility, experimentation and innovation, and freedom from 
that chain of command? How can we be responsive to the unique needs of our citizen-cus-
tomer and yet guarantee that all other citizens are treated equitably? How can we ensure 
that government works better, a process that often requires adaptation and increased expen- . 
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ditures, and at the same time ensure that government costs less, an effort that demands ef-
ficiency, cost cutting, and downsizing? 
2. Accommodation of Large Numbers 
Because the strategic issues approach to planning can draw together numerous stakehold-
ers in extended networks, new planning techniques have been invented to accommodate 
large groups of people. Stakeholder deliberations, no longer limited by organizational 
boundaries, have attracted thousands (Roberts 1997). Known by the generic terms "large-
group interventions" (Bunker and Alban 1997), they include the search conference (Emery 
and Purser 1996) and the future search conference (Weisbord 1992; Weisbord and Janoff 
1995). Designing and managing search conferences take a great deal of preparation and 
skill. In the hundreds of search conferences conducted worldwide, conveners have devel-
oped a data bank of experiences and knowledge enabling them to apply the techniques to 
any number of settings. Although a search conference is no guarantee that consensus on ac-
tion will emerge around a strategic issue question, evidence to date shows promise in deal-
ing with some very difficult controversial issues in environmental planning, community de-
velopment, and health and human services (Emery and Purser 1996; Weisbord 1992; 
Weisbord and Janoff 1995). 
C. A New Approach to Strategic Management-the Generative 
Approach 
A network-based planning process that accommodates large numbers would be very use-
ful to federal managers working toward a consensus on agency direction. However, the use-
fulness would be limited unless it also was constructed on a different set of organizing prin-
ciples. These principles have to do with values, skills, and leadership behavior. Since these 
principles are very different from those of the more traditional kinds found in the directive 
and adaptive approaches, they have been differentiated from the earlier forms with a new 
name-the generative approach to strategic management (Roberts 1997; 2000). 
The generative approach rests on cooperation as a result of the interdependent nature 
of the issues examined. By definition, network members address issues that are typically 
complex, ill defined, and boundary-spanning. Since no one social actor has complete own-
ership of the issue or the problem, no one social unit can lay claim to its solution without 
the involvement of others. Only by pooling their information, knowledge, skills, and re-
sources can members hope to be successful in generating a collective solution. Power plays, 
competition over scarce resources, or adversarial relations among network members may 
enable some social units to advance their particular cause over others, but in serving self-
interest they undermine the network's interests and impede its generative capacity to be 
creative. 
The skill of dialogue is essential in the cooperative effort. The word dialogue comes 
from the Greek word dialogos. It suggests, according to David Bohm, "a stream of mean-
ing flowing among us and through us and between us-a flow of meaning in the whole 
group, out of which will emerge a new understanding, something creative" (Bohm 
1992: 16). Dialogue requires participants to suspend their assumptions and enter into a pro-
cess of thinking together so the collective can attain insights beyond what is individually 
possible (Senge 1990). Grounded in reflection and inquiry, the discipline of dialogue en-
ables people to recognize the incoherent patterns of their thoughts and to prevent interac-
tions that undermine their effectiveness-fault finding rather than joint problem solving, 
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defensive routines rather than true communication, hoarding of information rather than 
sharing of it. In other words, dialogue enables network participants truly to engage and 
learn from one another as a group rather than as individuals. It opens up new ways of look-
ing at the world and encourages a deeper understanding of a system and its dynamics. 
The role of leadership in a generative approach to strategic management is very dif-
ferent from the heroic view in the directive and adaptive approaches. Collectiv~ learning 
requires network leaders to take on the roles of stewards, teachers, and designers (Senge 
1990). In a democratic society, stewards take responsibility for "social learning about pub-
lic problems and possibilities" (Reich 1990:8). They do more than help people discover 
what they want for themselves and then provide the best means for satisfying those wants. 
Their charge is to help people develop "alternative visions of what is desirable and possi-
ble, to stimulate discussion about them, to provoke reexamination of premises and values, 
and thus to broaden the range of potential responses and deepen society's understanding of 
itself' (Reich 1990:8). Rather than being mired in "thoughtless adherence to outmoded for-
mulation of problems," they help a broader repertoire of options and possibilities for the fu-
ture to surface. Under their guidance, the strategy process "should be more than and dif-
ferent from the discovery of what people want; it should entail the creation of contexts in 
which the public can critically evaluate and revise what it believes" (Reich 1990:8). 
As designers, leaders are concerned with creating and maintaining cooperative learn-
ing networks. Capable of seeing the entire system and how the various parts and elements 
interconnect to form the whole, they have the responsibility to design and convene oppor-
tunities to draw network members together. Through these collective experiences, it is 
hoped, network members will begin to develop a common identity and sense of purpose so 
that they can begin to learn from one another and deal productively with the critical issues · 
they face. As teachers, leaders establish the norms of cooperation and serve as role models 
for others. By encouraging network members to think more broadly and to take into ac-
count the dynamic forces shaping them, they help people to restructure their views of real-
ity (Senge 1990). And by moving people beyond quick fixes and local solutions to the un-
derlying causes of their problems, the leaders free them to see new possibilities for shaping 
their future together. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is a grand irony in considering strategic management in the federal government. 
Strategic management, a private sector business tool, has been introduced to federal gov-
ernment practice. Its principles and assumptions undergird the powerful reform initiatives 
embodied in GPRA and NPR. The directive approach to strategic management finds ex-
pression in GPRA; the adaptive approach, in NPR. Despite their differences, each initiative 
assumes that administrative rationality can fit in a world that operates on the basis of polit-
ical rationality-a curious assumption that overlooks the context from which administra-
tive practice springs. Enthusiasts seem only too willing to forget their roots and adopt busi-
ness transplants without much concern for their application. Perhaps their rush to reform is 
an acknowledgment of the desperate straits of federal management, and their uncritical ac-
ceptance suggests that doing something, whatever that might be, is better than doing noth-
ing. And besides, don't we all know that what is good for business is good for government? 
We share the views of those who have voiced doubts about GPRA and NPR and find 
their objections about the context compelling. "Public management cannot be divorced 
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from politics and the political culture. Rarely is poor management in the public sector the 
outcome of purely managerial reasons and a bureaucratic culture" (Caiden 1994:126). 
Cai den's and others' observation fits our own analysis of the necessary and sufficient ele-
ments of strategic management practice in the federal government. Conflict prevents the 
development of sufficient elements and further refinement of the necessary elements. Still 
locked into phase 1 in the evolution of strategic management, federal practice is limited and 
will likely stay that way for a long time, the efforts of NPR and GPRA notwithstanding. 
To the extent a consensus on any agency's direction emerges, strategic management 
and the changes it prompts hold promise for reform (Khademian 1995; Simon 1997; Wil-
son 1989). As in business, when there is consensus on organization and a dominant coali-
tion strong enough to enforce it, strategic management is a useful process and tool. Con-
sensus on agency direction will be hard won, however, since the executive and legislative 
branches are using very different approaches to strategic management practice. The exec-
utive branch has turned to the adaptive approach in an attempt to relieve itself of the bur-
den of a comprehensive, top-down goal setting process that is a poor fit in a complex, dy-
namic political economy. The executive branch recognizes its limits in controlling a 
bureaucracy the size and the complexity of the federal government in a very turbulent time. 
The legislative branch, in a struggle with the executive branch over the control of federal 
agencies, has opted for the directive approach. To allow federal agencies to use the adap-
tive approach risks that agencies either will do the bidding of the president or will be inde-
pendent, neither an attractive option to the Congress. Thus, to the extent that a dissensus 
exists-over agency direction, over approaches to strategic management, over which 
branch controls federal agencies-the principles of business strategic management will be 
of little value. 
Context matters, especially in the practice of strategic management (Baum and Dut-
ton 1996). We agree that public management "is different and has to be treated differently" 
and approached in its own terms (Caiden 1994: 126). That is why we strongly encourage the 
creation of new approaches to strategic management in the federal government, especially 
when agencies and bureaus lack consensus on direction. We have identified the elements 
that we think are important in building a consensus: network-based management, strategic 
issues planning that can accommodate large numbers, stakeholder collaboration and learn-
ing, the skills of dialogue, and leaders who act as stewards, designers, and teachers by invit-
ing stakeholders to join them in a process of civic discovery and a search for the common 
good (Block 1993; Bryson and Crosby 1992; Reich 1990; Schachter 1995). We call the ap-
proach generative; there may be other approaches as well. There is no one best way to man-
age strategically in public settings. The unique context and history of public management 
in the United States call for a range of options. We invite others to join us in the search. 
ENDNOTES 
I. The first National Performance Review report, From Red Tape to Results, was issued in 
September 1993. It was accompanied by 33 supporting documents. Taken together, these re-
ports total more than 1,900 pages. The NPR office has also released Gore's yearly updates such 
as Status Report (1994), Common Sense Government (1995), and Best Kept Secrets in Govern-
ment (1996). A GAO assessment of NPR progress can be found in Management Reform 
GAO/GGD-96-94. 
2. By documenting the difficulties in implementing both GPRA and NPR, we have given short 
shrift to the progress being made. Consult Gore ( 1994a, 1995, 1996) for a review of the changes 
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as a result of NPR. See also the GAO report that evaluates these claims (GAO, 1996). Progress 
in federal agencies is also noteworthy among the President's Quality Award Winners (Simon 
1997). 
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